Amakudata:
A dataset of bureaucratic revolving door hires*

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August 29, 2024

Abstract

Political economists have long speculated about the effects of connections between bureaucracies and the private sector. However, data tracing flows of civil servants from the bureaucracy to the private sector remains rare. This article presents a new dataset, *Amakudata*, which contains individual-level data of virtually *all* Japanese bureaucrats retiring into positions outside of the bureaucracy from 2009 to 2019. We first present how the dataset was created and validated. Next, we describe what the data reveals about the revolving door in Japan and beyond, and show that some sectors may be larger hirers of government personnel than previously thought. We conclude by discussing how the data can be used to investigate empirical and causal questions in diverse subjects such as corruption and regulatory capture; procurement, pork, and government waste; bureaucratic representation; and international trade and investment.

Keywords: Dataset; business & government; revolving door; money in politics; bureaucracy; Japan

Introduction

A growing literature examines the causes and consequences of revolving door hiring between the government and private sectors. However, empirical analysis of the effects of connections between firms and bureaucracies has been hampered by lack of data on bureaucratic personnel movements. Past empirical work has therefore largely focused on legislators—for whom data is more readily available—or relied on survey samples of bureaucratic connections.

We leverage a 2008 reform to the Japanese National Public Service Act—which requires ministries to report bureaucrats' re-employment destinations (*National Public Service Act 1947*, Articles 106-23 & 106-25)—to create a dataset of all revolving door appointments in Japan from 2009 to 2020. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first systematic dataset of all revolving door hires from the bureaucracy to industry in any country. Our data includes information on former place of employment and former title, as well as subsequent position and title. The name of the dataset, *Amakudata*, is a reference to *amakudari*—Japanese for "descent from heaven"—the common practice of civil servants "retiring" from the bureaucracy into lucrative outside positions at advanced stages of their careers.

Amakudata was created by digitizing over 1,000 pages of PDF reports of bureaucratic rehiring to create a list of over 13,000 instances of bureaucratic re-employment over roughly one decade. These reports are compiled by the Japanese cabinet office and released annually, and are accessible from the website of the Cabinet Secretariat.[1] Following digitization, rehiring data was extensively computationally and manually cleaned, and unique identifiers were added to facilitate merging with additional databases—including firm-level data—for empirical analysis.

We first present how the dataset was created. Next, we discuss how the data comports with previous theories of bureaucratic personnel flows within and outside of Japan. Finally, we examine how the data can be used to answer empirical questions on topics such as corruption, regulatory capture, pork barrel spending, bureaucratic representation, international trade and investment, and government waste. We also present an interactive online dashboard which can be used to explore the data.

A brief review of revolving door literature

There are two primary types of hiring connections between government and business: those with the politicians and those with bureaucrats. While an expansive empirical literature exists on the former (e.g., Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen (2012); Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson (2014); Faccio (2006); Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006); Khwaja and Mian (2005); Truex (2014)), the latter has remained mostly been theoretical, with some recent exceptions.

A large theoretical literature models the impact of bureaucratic revolving door hiring practices on regulatory outcomes. Researchers have argued both that the revolving door leads to regulatory capture, and leads to improved regulatory outcomes as regulators attempt to signal competence to potential future employees. See Dal Bó (2006) for an excellent overview.

Empirically, analyses of the bureaucratic revolving door have been hampered by a lack of data. Exceptions include recent papers by Asai, Kawai and Nakabayashi (2021), Barbosa

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[1] https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/jinjikyoku/jinji_j.html

and Straub (2020), and Lee and You (2023), who conduct novel data collection efforts to examine bureaucratic ties to single agencies or industry sectors in Japan, Brazil, and the United States, respectively.

Within Japan, the revolving door is well-known in both academia and amongst the general public. The revolving door—or *amakudari*—has been cited as a key source of institutional inertia in Japan, and has been blamed for multiple regulatory and policy failures[2] as well as inability to enact structural economic reforms. However, despite decades of theoretical and qualitative research on *amakudari*, systematic analysis has been hampered by a lack of data.

While *amakudari* has been understood as a Japanese version of the revolving door, we note that it is not typically "revolving"—retired bureaucrats do not often return to the bureaucracy, nor does the bureaucracy often hire mid-career private sector employees. We therefore use the term "revolving door" to speak to the literature addressing connections between private and public sector positions.

Dataset creation

Why do these data exist?

Pressure to regulate *amakudari* culminated in reforms to the National Public Service Act drafted under the government of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and enacted in 2008 (Kato 2017; Mishima 2013; Terada 2019). This reform requires civil servants above a certain rank to notify the Cabinet Office of their re-appointments (*National Public Service Act* 1947, Article 106-23). All notifications are therefore reported publicly at the end of each year (*National Public Service Act* 1947, as per Article 106-25) on the website of the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat.[3] While previous data linking *amakudari* bureaucrats to retirement destinations does exist, these data are limited to personnel sampled from individual firms (Horiuchi and Shimizu 2001) or ministries (Asai, Kawai and Nakabayashi 2021), and not necessarily publicly available.

Dataset creation and validation

Over 1000 pages of PDF reports documenting civil servant re-employment were uploaded to the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat website over the past decade as per the regulations outlined above (see Figure A1 for an example). We downloaded these PDF documents, digitized them using OCR software, and conducted extensive manual and programmatic cleaning to ensure individuals were properly matched with their places of employment. This process resulted in a list of over 13,000 instances of bureaucratic re-employments over roughly one decade.

To validate the accuracy of the data, we randomly sampled 300 *amakudari* hires from executive positions in private sector companies, and ensured that they were listed in organization records in the appropriate position. As part of a separate analysis, we also verified the appointments of all vice-ministerial and assistant vice-ministerial appointments in the data, which are typically reported in the economic newspaper *Nikkei*.

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[2]E.g., the savings and loan bailout (Carlson and Reed 2018; Mishima 2013), the HIV-contaminated blood scandal (Carlson and Reed 2018; Mishima 2013), and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant disaster (Diet of Japan 2012; Mishima 2013).

[3]https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/jinjikyoku/jinji_j.html

Variables

The raw source PDFs contain the following information pertaining to the bureaucrat: name, age, position at retirement, title at retirement, date of retirement, date of re-employment, place of re-employment, duties at place of re-employment, and industry of re-employment. We retain all of these variables. A major advantage of this dataset is therefore that it contains information of each retiring bureaucrat as well as each private firm/organization in which they are employed. This allows us to retrieve information both at the individual bureaucrat level as well as those at the firm/organization level for each hire.

In order to facilitate empirical analysis, we add additional categorical variables pertaining to both bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic employment. Civil servants are required to indicate their position and place of government employment. However, this is not required to be in a standardized format. We therefore constructed variables identifying the government ministry and agency of employment with a list of roughly 400 regular expression string matches at the agency level, then mapped each agency to its respective ministry. We also created indicator variables for the highest level positions of vice-minster and assistant vice-minister using string matches.[4]

Next, we created four variables identifying the type of employer. Specifically, we indicate whether the employer is: (1) a private corporation, public corporation, or government entity, (2) a for-profit or non-profit firm, (3) a stock, non-stock, intermediary, or public interest corporation, and (4) the specific firm type (e.g., stock company, LLC, foundation, credit cooperation, educational institution, etc.). All indicators were created with regular expression matching, followed by manual additions where multiple or no matches were returned.

Connections to other data sets

We also facilitate connections with third-party databases such as the *Nikkei NEEDS* financial database and stock market databases. While Nikkei's financial data is proprietary, we added Nikkei's unique identifier code to all firms that exist in both *Nikkei NEEDS* and *Amakudata* to facilitate ease of merging. This identifier was added through a exact match merge of firm names with the *Nikkei NEEDS* database, followed by manual cleaning and standardization of all remaining private firms to ensure that all possible matches were made. We also provide industry information and stock ticker information for all publicly traded firms that are also in the *Nikkei NEEDS* database.

Table 1 provides an example of some key variables and identifiers. A full list of all variables and their descriptions can be found in the codebook in the appendix. An interactive online dashboard is also available that allows user to explore appointments by, e.g., date, employer type, employer, ministry, agency, position, etc.

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[4]We do not categorize below this level as position titles below this level are not standardized across ministries. Classifications across ministries would therefore be erroneous, and should be examined on a ministry-specific basis.

Table 1: Amakudari dataset example

Date Retired	Agency	Ministry	Destination Firm	Firm Type (1)	TSE code
2012-05-01	Labour Standards Inspection Office	MHLW	TAKENAKA	Stock company	
2015-03-10	Minister's Secretariat	MAFF	THE JAPANESE INSTITUTE OF IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE	Foundation	
2012-06-27	National Tax Agency		WOOD ONE	Stock company	7898
2014-10-01	Minister's Secretariat	MLIT	ORGANIZATION FOR PROMITING URBAN DEVELOPMENT	Foundation	
2016-07-01	Regional Development Bureau	MLIT	CTI ENGINEERING	Stock company	9621
2014-05-01	Regional Legal Affairs Bureau	MOJ	JAPAN POST HOLDINGS	Stock company	6178
2015-04-01	Public Prosecutors Office	MOJ	TOKYO STAR BANK	Stock company	
2015-07-01	Japan Coast Guard	MLIT	KYUDEN SANGYO	Stock company	
2018-08-20	Public Prosecutors Office	MOJ	JAPAN EXCHANGE GROUP	Stock company	8697
2011-03-01	General	MAFF	JAPAN RACING ASSOCIATION	Other association	
2018-07-01	Regional Development Bureau	MLIT	JAPAN CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION CENTER	Foundation	
2014-07-01	Patent Office	METI	JAPAN PATENT INFORMATION ORGANIZATION	Foundation	
2011-06-15	Japan Coast Guard	MLIT	WAKACHIKU CONSTRUCTION	Stock company	1888
2016-09-01	Police		NIPPON KANZAI	Stock company	9728
2018-07-01	Shiga Labor Bureau	MHLW	SAFETY ASSOCIATION OF CONSTRUCTION AND LOADING VEHICLES	Incorporated association	
2018-06-04	Police		WEST JAPAN RAILWAY	Stock company	9021
2013-11-28	National Tax Agency		ONLY	Stock company	3376
2015-06-02	Japan Coast Guard	MLIT	MARINE RESCUE JAPAN	Incorporated association	
2018-04-01	Accounts Center	MOF	HITOTSUBASHI UNIVERSITY	Educational institution	
2013-10-01	Japan Coast Guard	MLIT	TOHOKU ELECTRIC POWER ENGINEER	Stock company	

Note: Does not include all variables.

Reexamining bureaucratic connections

Theories of the revolving door

Much research on the revolving door focuses on its impact on regulatory outcomes. Researchers have argued both that the revolving door harms the objectivity of regulators and leads to regulatory capture, and that the revolving door leads to improved regulatory outcomes as regulators attempt to signal competence to potential future employees.[5] Other literature highlights the use of connections to obtain lucrative government contracts.[6]

Our data provides evidence of the importance of both regulatory and contract connections, as highly regulated industries (e.g., banks, insurance, and utilities) and those reliant upon public contracts (e.g., transportation) are over-represented in our data relative to the overall economy (see Figure 1 and Table A1). Of the top 10 for-profit hirers in our dataset in terms of total number of hires, five are in the insurance business, three are in transportation, two are in financial services, and one is a large electronics supplier (see Figure A2).[7] As expected, industries tend to hire from the ministries that regulate them or generate their contracts (see Figure A5). For example, 77% of hires in the financial sector came from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and 52% of construction industry hires came from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MLIT).

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[5]See Dal Bó (2006) for an excellent overview.

[6]Either by leveraging networks, or through explicit *quid pro quos* whereby firms offer bureaucrats future employment in exchange for lucrative government contracts.

[7]One of these firms is Japan Post, which is one of Japan's largest financial firms and insurance providers.

Industry	Count amakudari	Percent of firms	Percent of amakudari	Difference
Services	474	15.9	14.6	-1.3
Finance	262	3.7	8.5	4.8
Construction	259	9.7	8.5	-1.2
Banks	255	0.6	7.8	7.2
Insurance	248	0.3	3.7	3.4
Land Transportation	243	2.8	5.8	3.0
Electric Appliances	196	4.1	5.1	1.0
Wholesale Trade	167	16.3	5.2	-11.1
Warehousing and Harbor transportation	128	1.6	4.5	2.9
Real Estate	125	4.9	4.0	-0.9

Figure 1: **Top 10 *amakudari* destinations vs. overall economy**

Our data also illuminates underappreciated aspects of revolving door hiring. For example, most literature on the revolving door focuses on private sector hiring. However, in the Japanese case, while most (6126) bureaucrats retire into for-profit firms (i.e., stock and non-stock corporations) as expected, roughly 40% (5301) retire into nonprofit "public interest" corporations (see Figure 2), and roughly half retire in either public or public interest destinations (6314).[8] Many of these public interest corporations regularly hire large numbers of bureaucrats from a single ministry, suggesting that there are direct channels from the bureaucracy to non-profit organizations, many of which receive large amounts of government assistance.[9] In addition to private companies and non-profits, a significant number of bureaucrats enter public corporations[10] or government positions. However, the highest ranking officials (assistant vice-ministers and vice-ministers) are more likely to enter government or for-profit roles, rather than public interest (see Table A2).


Figure 2: ***Amakudari* destinations by firm type**

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[8]This phenomenon is known as *yokosuberi* or "sliding sideways", as we will discuss later.

[9]See Incerti, Trevor, "jNPO Database" at https://github.com/tincerti/jNPO for a dataset of all Japanese government contracts with public interest corporations.

[10]Japanese: *dokuritsugyōseihōjin*. This includes destinations such as patent offices, courts, notaries, etc.

Theories of amakudari in Japan

Amakudari has played prominent role in Japanese politics research in the postwar period. Our data allow us to answer questions about this phenomenon that previously required speculation, and reveals patterns that offer new insights that differ from previous conceptions.

First, we can observe which ministries placed the most officials into post-bureaucracy positions, and when. In absolute terms, it comes as little surprise that the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MLIT) placed the most officials into post-ministerial jobs over the past decade (see Figure A7). MLIT is the second largest ministry by number of employees (after the Ministry of Justice), and controls many government infrastructure contracts. More surprising is that the number of hires per year from MLIT increased from fewer than 100 per year in 2010 to over 300 in 2018 (see Figure A6). Our data also reveals that adjusted for number of employees, the prestigious Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) is the most successful at placing bureaucrats into *amakudari* positions (see Figure A8).

Our data confirms that *amakudari* is more of an exit door than a revolving door. Japan has a mandatory "retirement" age of 60 for civil servants, and most leave at or just before this age. However, the more prestigious ministries most heavily involved in regulation (e.g., MOF and METI) tend to have younger and wider retirement age distributions than their counterparts (see Figure A11).

Second, we can see which firms hire former bureaucrats, how many officials they hire, who they hire, and from where. Government offices and stock corporations have the largest appetite for the highest ranking civil servants (vice-ministers and assistant vice-ministers), while public interest and non-stock corporations hire smaller percentages of such top officials. The most common posts bureaucrats take in for-profit companies are tax advisors, consultants, auditors, lawyers, board members (internal and external), and executives. Firms most commonly draw from the ministries that directly oversee them, but virtually all industries draw from virtually all ministries (see Figure A5).

The majority of firms hire only one bureaucrat over the ten year period that we observe (see Figure A3). However, 401 firms hired 5 or more bureaucrats, 135 firms hired ten or more, 23 hired 25 or more, and 5 hired 50 or more. The largest hirer in our dataset is *Taiyō Kyōsai*, a police cooperative which offers services such as loans and life insurance, and which hired 89 police officials over the period we observe.[11] Outside of the police cooperative, the next largest hirer is the Industrial Property Cooperation Center (*Kōgyōshoyūken Kyōroku Sentā*), which hired 56 METI officials, all from the patent office. The largest private, for-profit hirer was Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company, which hired 52 former officials from 11 different ministries or agencies.[12]

Third, as noted above, our data shows that nonprofit "public interest corporations" attract a larger number of retirees than previously thought. This phenomena has been discussed in previous literature, where it is referred to as *yokosuberi* or "sliding sideways"

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[11]Interviews suggest that insurers who hire primarily from the police or the Ministry of Defense (where we also see this pattern), may be engaging in a sales tactic whereby senior colleagues (*senpai*) use their connections to sell insurance products to their junior colleagues (*kōhai*).

[12]The cabinet office, the Tōhoku Reconstruction Agency, MOD, MOF, MOFA, MHLW, MIAC, MLIT, and the police.

(e.g., Carlson and Reed (2018) and Jones (2013)). However, our data reveals both the large scale of this phenomenon and the difficulty in defining *yokosuberi*. Japan's complex legal structure governing nonprofit organizations blurs the lines between private and public, and our data reveals that virtually every kind of nonprofit organization has made bureaucratic hires—from those with close government connections and funding, to universities, trade associations, social welfare corporations, and sports and recreation associations.[13]

In addition, our data reveals that there are direct pipelines from individual ministries to public interest corporations (see Figure 3 and the example of the Industrial Property Co-operation Center above). This finding is significant, as public interest corporations received approximately 4 trillion yen in government contracts between 2010 and 2020 (Incerti 2024). By contrast, for-profit stock corporations and non-stock corporations tend to draw from multiple ministries (see Figure A4), and the largest hirers are highly regulated industries such as insurance. However, while large publicly traded firms tend to draw from multiple ministries, as noted above, some industries such as transportation and finance draw overwhelmingly from particular ministries.


Figure 3: Flows of bureaucrats from ministries to top 10 public interest corporations (by number of hires)

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[13]In Japanese, this spans legal entities with close government ties such as 独立行政法人, to other classifications of public interest corporations such as 一般財団法人, 公益法人, 特例財団法人, 社会福祉法人, etc. These classifications are kept and cleaned in *Amakudata*.

Finally, our data allows us to speak to both recent scandals and the amount of latitude in current *amakudari* regulations with greater clarity than previously possible. For example, our data provides evidence that civil servants may be able to skirt rehiring regulations (possibly by being granted exceptions) prohibiting former bureaucrats from immediate employment into sectors they previously regulated. Our data reveals that 28 MOF officials retired into private sector banks since regulations were passed. 115 retired into regional credit unions known as *shinkin* banks, including 90 from regional finance bureaus. A further four officials retired into *shinkin* banks from their direct regulator—the Financial Services Agency.[14] Consistent with a scandal in which the education ministry (MEXT) was accused of helping its employees find jobs at universities, we see 95 appointments from the education ministry to universities between 2009-2017. However, we find that MEXT continued to place similar numbers of individuals at universities following the scandal, with a further 13 officials entering universities in 2018 (Figure A9).

Empirical applications and future research

Corruption, capture, and favoritism

Amakudari is often described as a form of corruption (Mizoguchi and Van Quyen 2012), even if—like other revolving door phenomena—it does not meet many formal definitions of the term.[15] However, cases in which *amakudari* may represent explicit corruption—e.g., through explicit *quid pro quos* or bribery—remain understudied.

Amakudari is more regularly conceptualized as a conflict of interest that manifests through mechanisms such as regulatory capture and favoritism. Bureaucratic links have been hypothesized to impact regulation in two primary fashions: (1) explicit capture whereby regulations are modified in favor of firms over public good, and (2) as a method of easing costs for companies in financial trouble (Horiuchi and Shimizu 2001; Mizoguchi and Van Quyen 2012). Linking rehiring data with regulatory enforcement data could shed light on this issue.

A growing literature shows that connections to political office often provide tangible benefits to firms (Blanes i Vidal, Draca and Fons-Rosen 2012; Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson 2014; Faccio 2006; Faccio, Masulis and McConnell 2006; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Truex 2014). Fewer works have examined the impact of bureaucratic connections on firm performance. Exceptions include Lee and You (2023), who find that firms with connections to USTR bureaucrats allow for decreased lobbying spending; Barbosa and Straub (2020), who show that medical supply firms that hire former civil servants offer lower prices to the government; and Asai, Kawai and Nakabayashi (2021), who find increases in government contract awards for firms tied to 281 former civil servants from Japan's MLIT. Our data should allow for similar and more systematic investigations into the benefits of bureaucratic ties, such as contracts, government loans, and stock price boosts.

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[14]Note that the Financial Services Agency is not located within the Ministry of Finance.

[15]Such as illicit activities including grand corruption, petty corruption, or electoral fraud. By contrast, *amakudari* fits within Rose-Ackerman (2018)'s conception of more ambiguous cases such as conflicts of interest that require "reorganization of government institutions and their relationship to the private sector" to address.

International political economy

Implications of bureaucratic ties travel beyond the sphere of domestic politics. Research on international political economy may also benefit from closer attention to firms' political connections, including the ones through bureaucratic channels. Bureaucrats play a central role in the foreign economic policymaking process, as they negotiate and implement a large swath of trade and investment policies. Given these policies' potential impact on firms' exporting, importing, and foreign production activities, we can expect firms will try to leverage bureaucratic connections in this arena as well, in an attempt to bring policies closer to their preferences.

A growing literature in international political economy regards firms as primary actors behind politics of international economic transactions, such as trade, foreign investments and capital flows, and immigration (Kim and Osgood 2019; Kim, Liao and Miyano 2024; Peters 2017). For example, an overwhelming amount of trade lobbying in the United States are conducted at the individual firm level instead of collectively at the industry level, indicating that firm preferences are affecting the pattern of U.S. tariff reductions (Kim 2017).

Our data identifying firm-level connections with the home government offers a unique and promising opportunity to empirically test these firm-level theories, which often suffer from lack of fine-grained data. In particular, this data allows us to push the frontier in understanding how nationality and home government matters even for international business activities and even for multinational firms in this age of globally fragmented productions.

Government waste

Beyond connections leading to inefficiencies in procurement and loan decisions, our data show that over 40% of bureaucrats ultimately retire into the non-profit companies (see Figure 2). A generous reading of this phenomenon would suggest that bureaucrats are continuing their long-standing mission of public service even after they leave government. A less generous interpretation would suggest that the bureaucracy has established cushy high-paying employment centers for its former workers on the government dime, and/or that bureaucrats use these positions to wait out the two year post-retirement "cooling off period" during which they cannot join a company they directly regulated. Further analysis could allow for adjudication of these two theories.

Bureaucratic representation

Political scientists often analyze the degree to which elected officials reflect the demographic makeup of eligible voters. The degree to which bureaucrats reflect the general public is less clear due to lack of data availability. Our data sheds light on this question, showing that the Japanese bureaucracy—or at least elite bureaucrats entering post-retirement positions—is highly unrepresentative of the general populace. The Japanese bureaucracy is, for example, often criticized for the lack of women amongst its ranks, and our data confirms that those currently leaving the bureaucracy for new roles are overwhelmingly men. Additionally, there are zero names of foreign origin among retirees. Scholars could, for example, investigate the degree to which the bureaucracy is unrepresentative of the general public, as well as whether a lack of representativeness makes bureaucratic policy making less reflective of public wishes.

Qualitative investigations

We also stress that our data can be used in a qualitative capacity to investigate connections between the bureaucracy and specific firms or interest groups. For example, Maclachlan (2024) uses *Amakudata* to demonstrate how the post-retirement employment of bureaucrats into postal firms has served as a mechanism of resistance to postal privatization and reform. Similar analyses could be conducted for ministries with relatively fewer employees but for which there is high public interest in personal movements, such as the Ministry of Defense (see Figure A10 for the top ten hirers of MOD officials).

Serial rehiring

We note that a limitation of our dataset is that we are only able to observe a bureaucrat's first post outside of the bureaucracy. We therefore do not observe subsequent appointments, for which there are no reporting requirements.[16] As regulations prohibit bureaucrats from joining firms that they interact with directly for two years following their retirement from the civil service, our data does not include future connections that may lead to *quid pro quo* exchanges. Future research could therefore attempt to track bureaucrats beyond their first appointment, and observe subsequent places of employment.

Conclusion

Amakudata contains detailed information on bureaucratic retirements, including: name; age; bureaucratic position title; ministry of employment; agency of employment; date of retirement; date of re-employment; place of re-employment; industry of re-employment; identifiers for private, public, and government entities; identifiers for-profit or non-profit firms; identifiers for specific firm type (e.g., stock company, LLC, foundation, etc.); stock tickers; and identifier codes to facilitate connections to commonly used financial databases.

We show that *Amakudata* can be used by researchers in a variety of fields ranging from bureaucratic representation to international political economy, and provide an interactive online dashboard which can be used to explore the data. We hope that this resource will be widely used by scholars of both Japan and economics, management, and political science more generally.

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[16]Observers of Japanese politics will note that this implies that we do not observe *wataridori* (literally "migratory birds"), the practice of serial reemployment in multiple firms after leaving the civil service.

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Part II
Supporting Information

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Cabinet office PDF filing example

番号	氏名	離職時の年齢	離職時の官職	離職日	再就職日（注２）	再就職先の名称	再就職先の業務内容	再就職先における地位	国家公務員法第106条の3第2項第4号の規定に基づく承認（以下「求職の承認」という。）の有無（注３）	官民人材交流センターの援助の有無（注４）
1	三木　宏	60	内閣官房内閣参事官（内閣情報調査室内閣情報集約センター主幹）	H24.3.31	H24.4.1	財団法人世界政経調査会	内外の政治、経済、社会事情等の調査研究、資料の収集	事務局長	無	無
2	村田　啓子	49	内閣府経済社会総合研究所上席主任研究官	H23.9.30	H23.10.1	公立大学法人首都大学東京	教育・研究	教授	無	無
3	井上　侑子	29	内閣府男女共同参画局推進課課長補佐	H23.12.31	H24.1.1	高砂熱学工業株式会社	設備工事事業、設備機器の製造・販売事業	法務部社員	無	無
4	齋藤　潤	60	内閣府政策統括官（経済財政分析担当）	H24.1.10	H24.1.11	学校法人青山学院	教育・研究	青山学院大学非常勤講師	無	無
5	乾　友彦	49	内閣府経済社会総合研究所上席主任研究官併任大臣官房統計委員会担当室長	H24.3.31	H24.4.1	日本大学	教育・研究	経済学部教授	無	無
6	岩城　秀裕	55	内閣府経済社会総合研究所上席主任研究官	H24.3.31	H24.4.1	野村證券株式会社	証券業	金融市場調査部次長	無	無
7	建井　順子	42	内閣府男女共同参画局調査課調査分析専門官	H24.3.31	H24.4.1	国立大学法人東京大学	教育・研究	社会科学研究所学術支援専門職員	無	無
8	大滝　宏二	60	宮内庁長官官房用度課長	H24.3.31	H24.4.1	日本赤十字社	災害救護業務、病院経営等	常勤嘱託	無	無
9	萩原　一彦	60	宮内庁管理部車馬課長	H24.3.31	H24.4.1	財団法人菊葉文化協会	皇室に関係する伝承文化、文化財等の調査研究等	経理課長	無	無

Figure A1: Example original PDF document

Additional descriptive statistics

Appointments by industry

Table A1: Amakudari industry destinations vs. overall economy

Industry	Count amakudari	Percent of firms	Percent of amakudari	Difference
Services	474	15.9	14.6	-1.3
Finance	262	3.7	8.5	4.8
Construction	259	9.7	8.5	-1.2
Banks	255	0.6	7.8	7.2
Insurance	248	0.3	3.7	3.4
Land Transportation	243	2.8	5.8	3.0
Electric Appliances	196	4.1	5.1	1.0
Wholesale Trade	167	16.3	5.2	-11.1
Warehousing and Harbor transportation	128	1.6	4.5	2.9
Real Estate	125	4.9	4.0	-0.9
Electric Power & Gas	118	0.6	3.2	2.6
Information & Communication	109	2.5	3.5	1.0
Machinery	101	4.1	3.1	-1.0
Transport Equipment	88	1.9	3.2	1.3
Retail Trade	83	5.7	3.1	-2.6
Chemicals	72	3.0	2.5	-0.5
Air Transportation	70	0.2	2.0	1.8
Foods	62	3.3	2.2	-1.1
Marine Transportation	49	0.8	1.7	0.9
Iron & Steel	38	1.1	0.9	-0.2
Other Products	34	3.9	1.2	-2.7
Nonferrous Metals	25	0.8	0.9	0.1
Pharmaceutical	23	0.7	0.8	0.1
Glass & Ceramics Products	22	1.9	0.7	-1.2
Textile & Apparels	22	4.2	0.8	-3.4
Metal Products	21	2.4	0.8	-1.6
Precision Instruments	18	1.0	0.7	-0.3
Oil & Coal Products	17	0.2	0.6	0.4
Mining	5	0.3	0.2	-0.1
Rubber Products	4	0.4	0.2	-0.2
Pulp & Paper	2	0.9	0.1	-0.8
Fishery, Agriculture & Forestry	1	0.3	0.0	-0.3

Note: "Percent economy" calculation is the total number of firms in each industry divided by all firms in the Nikkei NEEDS database.

Appointments by hirer

**Figure A2: Top 10 for-profit hirers of former bureaucratic officials**

**Figure A3: Empirical cumulative distribution function of number of hires per firm**

Figure A4: Flows of bureaucrats from ministries to top 10 for-profit corporations (by number of hires)

Appointments by ministry

**Figure A5:** *Amakudari* **hires by industry and ministry (all years)**

Figure A6: *Amakudari* appointments by ministry over time

Figure A7: *Amakudari* ministry of origin

Figure A9: **University hires of MEXT officials**

Figure A8: *Amakudari* ministry of origin adjusted for ministry size (all years)

**Figure A10: Top ten hirers of MOD officials**

Background and demographics

Figure A11: Distribution of age of exit from ministry, by ministry

Note: vertical line at "mandatory" retirement age of 60.

Table A2: Destination firm type by former position level (all years)

Firm type	Position level	N	% of destination type
Government	Assistant Vice-Minister	17	8.3%
Government	Vice-Minister	8	3.9%
For-profit corporation	Assistant Vice-Minister	180	2.94%
For-profit corporation	Vice-Minister	119	1.94%
Public interest corporation	Assistant Vice-Minister	138	2.6%
Public interest corporation	Vice-Minister	61	1.2%
Public corporation	Assistant Vice-Minister	17	1.36%
Public corporation	Vice-Minister	8	0.64%

Codebook

Amakudata codebook

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Introduction

Amakudata uses Japanese government records of civil servant reemployment to create a dataset of post-bureaucracy employment destinations of civil servants. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first systematic dataset of all revolving door hires from government to industry in any country. The name of the dataset is a reference to *amakudari*—a Japanese term meaning "descent from heaven"—the common practice of civil servants "retiring" from the bureaucracy into the private sector at advanced stages of their careers.

A 2008 reform to Japan's National Public Service Act (NPSA) requires ministries to report post-bureaucracy employment destinations of civil servants. These records are compiled by the Cabinet Office and released annually. These releases comprise the primary source of the dataset, and are accessible from the website of the Cabinet Secretariat.[1] *Amakudata* currently covers years 2009-2019, but will later be expanded to additional years.

The final dataset is available in .csv and .RData formats.

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‡The World Bank
§The World Bank
[1] https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/jinjikyoku/jinji_j.html

Scope and coverage

- Units/observations: (unique) individuals

- Geographic scope: Japan (all prefectures)

- Dates covered: April 2009 — April 2019

- Number of observations: 13,656

- Unique rehiring destinations: 7,650

- Unique private firms: 3,875

- Unique non-profit entities: 2,659

Variable descriptions

Note: (J) denotes a string variable in Japanese, (E) denotes a string variable in English, and (N) denotes a numeric variable.

1. *date_ret*: (N) Date of retirement from civil service.

2. *name*: (J) Name of civil servant being reemployed outside of civil service.

3. *age_ret*: (N) Age at which civil servant retired from civil servant.

4. *post_former*: (J) Last position held within the civil service.

5. *agency*: (E) Agency of employment upon retirement from civil service.

6. *ministry*: (E) Ministry of employment upon retirement from civil service.

7. *ministry_short*: (E) Abbreviated name of ministry of employment upon retirement from civil service.

8. *position_level*: (E) Indicator for top level positions within the bureaucracy.

9. *firm_dest*: (J) Unmodified firm destination as filed with the Cabinet Secretariat.

10. *firm_dest_clean*: (J) Firm destinations with names corrected to facilitate matching.

11. *firm_dest_parent*: (J) Parent company of firm destination, if applicable.

12. *firm_dest_kana*: (J) Cleaned firm name in katakana.

13. *firm_dest_en*: (E) Cleaned firm name in English.

14. *firm_dest_parent*: Nikkei NEEDS company code to facilitate merging with Nikkei NEEDS financial database

15. *tse_code*: Stock code ticker on Tokyo Stock Exchange. From Nikkei NEEDS financial database.

16. *listed*: Indicator for whether the destination is a publicly listed firm.

17. *post_dest*: (J) Position title in destination firm (unmodified text as filed with the Cabinet Secretariat).

18. *indust_dest*: (J) Industry description of destination firm (unmodified text as filed with the Cabinet Secretariat).

19. *industry*: (E) Name of industry for private firms, otherwise type of non-private firm. Uses Nikkei industry classification.

20. *industry_detail*: (E) More specific classification of industry classification for private firms, otherwise type of non-private firm.

21. *city*: (J) Firm destination headquarters city.

22. *firm_type1_en*: (E) Most specific corporate classification (e.g., education institution, foundation, law firm, local government, non-stock company, shinkin bank, stock company, etc.).

23. *firm_type2_en*: (E) Less specific corporate classification (public interest, stock, intermediary, non-stock, government).

24. *firm_type3_en*: (E) For-profit vs. non-profit corporate classification.

25. *firm_type4_en*: (E) Public, private, or government corporate classification.

Missingness indicators

The following indicators are used to denote missingness.

- *-99*: A column value is missing by definition (e.g. a stock code for a public or unlisted entity).

- *99*: A column value is missing because no match was found, but one could or should theoretically exist.